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012.12.0Abstract Prognostics and health management (PHM) is very important to guarantee the reliability
and safety of aerospace systems, and sensing and test are the precondition of PHM. Integrating
design for testability into early design stage of system early design stage is deemed as a fundamental
way to improve PHM performance, and testability model is the base of testability analysis and
design. This paper discusses a hierarchical model-based approach to testability modeling and anal-
ysis for heading attitude system health management. Quantiﬁed directed graph, of which the nodes
represent components and tests and the directed edges represent fault propagation paths, is used to
describe fault-test dependency, and quantitative testability information is assigned to nodes and
directed edges. The fault dependencies between nodes can be obtained by functional fault analysis
methodology that captures the physical architecture and material ﬂows such as energy, heat, data,
and so on. By incorporating physics of failure models into component, the dynamic process of a
failing or degrading component can be projected onto system behavior, i.e., system symptoms.
Then, the analysis of extended failure modes, mechanisms and effects is utilized to construct fault
evolution-test dependency. Using this integrated model, the designers and system analysts can
assess the test suite’s fault detectability, fault isolability and fault predictability. And heading atti-
tude system application results show that the proposed model can support testability analysis and
design for PHM very well.
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With the increase of the function, structure and technology
complexity of aerospace systems, equipment maintenance and
support mode is gradually converting to predictive mainte-
nance, autonomic logistics from corrective maintenance,
preventive maintenance and condition-based maintenance.1–3
Health monitoring and prognostics of complex equipments is
a basic requirement to the new logistics modes in many applica-
tion domains where safety, reliability, and availability of the
systems are considered mission critical. As a key complementtd.Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
202 G. Liu et al.to the new logistics modes, prognostics and health management
(PHM) is an approach to system life-cycle support that seeks to
reduce/eliminate inspections and time-based maintenance
through accurate monitoring, incipient fault detection, fault
evolution track and remaining useful life prediction.4 PHM is
signiﬁcant to improve aerospace system safety, reliability,
maintainability and affordability to reduce life cycle cost and
realize autonomic logistics.5,6 With the rapid development of
information sensing, condition monitoring and fault prognos-
tics, etc., PHMhas been an important part in aerospace systems
such as helicopter, aircraft engine, missile, etc.
Generally speaking, PHM mainly consists of condition
monitoring, fault diagnostics, fault prognostics, health evalua-
tion and decision control.7,8 In order to conduct these func-
tions very well, a much broader range of asset health related
test information should be collected. There is no doubt that
test information forms the foundation upon which all the
PHM systems are based.9–11
Testability is a design characteristic which allows the status
(operable, inoperable, or degraded) of an item to be
determined and the isolation of faults within the item to be
performed in a timely manner.12 In order to reduce develop-
ment cycle and cost and improve integration effects, design
for testability (DFT) should be integrated into early design
stage of system and developed concurrently with system de-
sign. In a word, information sensing and test are the precondi-
tion of PHM, and the traditional attached test design
methodology should give way to the systematic concurrent
DFT techniques. At present, model based DFT is very popu-
lar.13,14 One aspect is that the model-based way is convenient
to amend the design scheme according to feedback testability
analysis results and hence reduces system development cycle
and cost; the other is that the knowledge reusability of models
enables different engineers at different design stages to have
consistent understandings and hence makes DFT be developed
concurrently and consistently.
Obviously, testability model is the base of testability analy-
sis, design and validation. The existing testability models such
as information ﬂow graph15 and multi-signal ﬂow graph,16
which are effective for fault detection and isolation, only de-
scribe fault-test dependency qualitatively and lack quantitative
PHM-related testability information. However, DFT for PHM
should pay more attention to the requirements of fault predict-
ability rather than only to fault detection and isolation needs.
The fault-test dependency only describes the true/false detect-
ability of test to fault, and it is insufﬁcient to analyze the sup-
port level of testability for fault prognostics. As we know that
a fault is detectable doesn’t mean it is predictable. Whether a
fault is predictable or not depends on two basic conditions:
one is the fault should be gradual in nature; the other is the
fault should be a key fault. Besides, the predictability of a fault
is also related to timely detection and evolution track. If a fault
is detected when or after the fault leads to a failure, fault prog-
nostics becomes insigniﬁcant; further, if the evolution process
of a fault cannot be tracked by tests, (data driven-based) fault
prognostics may not be realized. So testability model for
PHM, besides describing fault-test dependency, should be able
to describe detectability of test to fault early state and
trackability of test to fault evolution process which is called
fault evolution-test dependency in the paper. It is necessary
to study a novel testability modeling approach for PHM of
aerospace systems.2. Hierarchical modeling methodology
To address these problems, a hierarchical modeling methodol-
ogy is proposed in the paper. The approach to multi-level
modeling of complex aerospace systems combines system-level
and component-level modeling. At the system level, functional
fault analysis (FFA) and quantiﬁed directed graph (QDG) are
used to describe fault-test dependency and PHM-related test-
ability information; while at the component level, physics of
failure (PoF) models and extended failure modes, mechanisms
and effects analysis (FMMEA) are combined to analyze fault
evolution-test dependency.
2.1. Fault-test dependency modeling
Inputs that are needed to build the system model include, but
are not limited to, system schematics (component connectivity
topology), failure modes, test resource, system functional
behavior, information ﬂow (energy, material, data) and expert
experience. Many approaches such as Petri net, fault tree can
be used to model the knowledge. Considering the limited
knowledge at early design stage of system and in order to make
the system model highly consistent with system constituents,
we propose QDG. QDG is able to describe system cause-effect
dependency easily and can be developed from partial informa-
tion such as system structure and function. In QDG, nodes
represent components and tests and the directed edges repre-
sent fault effect propagation paths. Quantitative testability
information is assigned to nodes and directed edges in the
forms of probability, fuzziness and uncertainty.
Formally, a QDG consists of four sections.
(1) A ﬁnite set of components making up of a system,
C= {c1, c2, . . . , cL}, and component attribute denotes
whether a component is a key and/or important one
or not.
(2) A ﬁnite set ofm available failure modes, F= {f1, f2, . . . , fm}.
Each component is associated with a set of failure
modes, Fl = {fl1, fl2, . . . , flp}, 1 6 l 6 L. Obviously,
F= [ Fl. Failure mode attributes related closely to
testability analysis are fault type (F_Type), failure prior
probability (F_Prob) and failure criticality (F_Crit).
Generally, F_Type can be gradual fault (F_Type = 1)
or abrupt fault (F_Type = 0); F_Prob can be calculated
according to history data, reliability design documents
and expert experience; F_Crit can be type I (cata-
strophic), type II (fatal), type III (critical) or type IV
(light).
(3) A ﬁnite set of n available tests T= {t1, t2, . . . , tn}. Each
test may be of the following quantitative attributes: test
time (T_Time), test cost (T_Cost), test signal to noise
rate (T_Stnr) and test failure rate (T_Rate). Test is of
general meanings, usually including build in test (BIT),
automatic test equipment (ATE), a variety of sensors
and even virtue test methods.
(4) A ﬁnite set of directed edges, E= {e1, e2, . . . , eo}. The
directed edges denote fault effect propagation paths,
which may be a physical link in the system or a virtue
path. A directed edge is uniquely characterized by fault
propagation probability (E_Prob), fault propagation
time (E_Time) and fault propagation gain (E_Gain).
Fig. 2 Schematic of fault degradation model.
Fig. 1 Flowchart and relationships of extended FMMEA.
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response, i.e., the propagation time is deﬁned as the rise
time when the response reaches 10% of the steady gain,
while the fault propagation gain is deﬁned as the
steady-state gain.17
In the multi-signal ﬂow graphs or information ﬂow graphs,
the directed edges specify the system structural connectivity
which can be called physical paths in the paper. Generally,
physical paths do not mean fault propagation paths, but fault
effect propagation must be through the physical paths, so
physical paths are necessary but not the sufﬁcient condition
of fault effect propagation. However, in the QDG, the directed
edges represent fault propagation paths. The propagation
paths may be physical links which might be ﬂuid, thermal, elec-
trical, etc., or virtual paths which may not be a physical link
but represent certain fault effect propagation. So QDG has
great advantages to describe fault-fault dependency and
fault-test dependency, but may deviate from system structure
topology to some extent.
In QDG, fault dependency analysis is very important. For
digital systems, fault dependencies can be obtained by failure
modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) due to its good
modularity and fault propagation certainty. However, for com-
plex aerospace systems consisting of mechanics, electronics and
hydraulics, the fault dependencies obtained only by FMECA
are unilateral or even wrong. For these systems, fault propaga-
tion is usually accompanied by ﬂow of energy, signal or data, so
fault dependencies can be analyzed by system dynamic physical
behavior analysis combined with system structure and func-
tion. FFA provides a feasible way to the idea.
FFA is a high-level, functional model of the system that cap-
tures the physical architecture, including the physical connectiv-
ity of energy, material, and data ﬂows. The methodology can be
used to analyze the fault effect propagation paths.18 As a simple
example, considering tank external leak failure mode, the
failure mode effects propagate along the liquid (material) ﬂow
to the next component ‘‘valve’’ and along the pressure signal
(signal) ﬂow to the test node ‘‘pressure sensor’’, so fault (exter-
nal leak)-test (pressure sensor) dependency can be obtained.
2.2. Fault evolution-test dependency modeling
The intrinsic difference of testability for PHM from the tradi-
tional testability (for fault detection and isolation) is that the
former pays much attention to the support of DFT for
PHM, especially fault prognostics besides fault detection and
isolation requirements. Therefore, gradual key faults are espe-
cially taken into account. As stated previously, it is necessary
to consider the detectability of test to fault early state and
trackability of test to fault evolution process, i.e., fault evolu-
tion-test dependencies. Component level model is mainly used
to analyze fault evolution-test dependencies.
Generally, fault degradation process always accompanies
system behavior variation such as performance parameters
(e.g., speed, pressure, strain, resistance, current and voltage);
environmental parameters (e.g., temperature, vibration, acous-
tics and humidity); operational parameters (e.g., usage fre-
quency, usage severity, usage time, power, and heat
dissipation). Based on the understandings, physics of failure
models can be incorporated into component to map the dy-
namic process of a failing or degrading component to systembehavior, i.e., system symptoms. And system symptoms are
closely related to fault mechanisms and test conﬁguration, so
the extended FMMEA is further utilized to analyze fault
evolution-test dependency.
The traditional FMECA analyzes all the possible failure
modes and the corresponding causes and effects statically in
order to determine the proper detection methods, and is very
suitable for the traditional testability analysis and design.
However, FMECA lacks fault mechanism description which
is very important for fault prognostics and fault evolution-test
dependency analysis. FMMEA is a PoF based methodology for
assessing the root cause failure mechanisms of a given sys-
tem.9,10 In fact, fault occurrence usually accompanies a series
of responses, including fault effects, fault symptoms, fault
models, monitoring parameters and test conﬁguration. So the
extended FMMEA proposed by the paper is shown in Fig. 1.
The turbine pump vane is introduced as an example to illus-
trate the component level modeling process.19 Due to corro-
sion/erosion, the main failure mode of vane is cross-sectional
area loss, which may change the surface and reduce the total
area of vanes available for moving ﬂuids and further cause tur-
bulence in the pump and reduce the efﬁciency in the ﬂuid ﬂow.
The schematic of fault degradation model is shown in Fig. 2,
where q is corrosion rate, Da total vane area loss, Dt time inter-
val, r pitting growth radius.
It is simply assumed that the corrosion rate q of vane mate-
rial is following Balbaud-Celerier and Barbier rule.20
q ¼ Kðcs  cbÞ ð1Þ
where K is the mass transfer coefﬁcient dependent on the ﬂow
velocity, cs the corrosion product concentration at the
204 G. Liu et al.liquid–solid interface dependent on the local temperature, and
cb the concentration in the bulk ﬂow often set to zero.
20 q, K
and cs are constants when constant ﬂow velocity and temper-
ature, and no change in ﬂuid concentration are assumed. With
Fig. 2, the area loss at one pitting location can be expressed as
Dai ¼ qprDt ¼ qpqtDt ð2Þ
The total vane area loss Da can be expressed as
Da ¼Pni¼1ai ¼ 12 pn2t2
n ¼ ðcs  cbÞ2
Pn
i¼1K
2
i
(
ð3Þ
According to the conservation of power and momentum
pout ¼ ðah b/outÞh ð4Þ
where pout is the pump pressure, /out the corresponding mass
ﬂow rate, h angular velocity of the pump rotor, a the total area
of its vanes and b the effective loss in moved mass due to the
curvature of the vanes. Based on the ﬁrst order perturbation
theory, we get
DaðtÞ ¼ bD/ðtÞh DpðtÞ
h2
ð5Þ
The fault degradation process is projected onto system behav-
iors by Eq. (5), and fault evolution process Da can be detected
and tracked by the continuous mass ﬂow and pump pressure
monitoring.
The FMMEA of the vane cross-sectional area loss is shown
in Table 1. One can see clearly that the fault evolution process
can be detected and tracked by pressure test and/or speed test.
3. Testability analysis based on hierarchical model
Once the system hierarchical model is built, the designers and
system analysts can assess the capability of the test suite to de-
tect the occurrence of faults, isolate the location of faults and
predicate the trend of faults. Further, the model can be used to
analyze redundant tests, back loops and ambiguity groups,
and so on.
3.1. Preliminary theory
Generally speaking, testability analysis for PHM mainly in-
cludes inherent testability analysis and achieved testability
analysis.16 The inherent testability only depends on system
hardware design and is not affected by test stimulation and re-
sponse data. Inherent testability analysis usually includes
undetectable faults (UFs), detectable faults (DFs), isolable
faults (IFs), predictable faults (PFs), ambiguity groupsTable 1 Extended FMMEA of vane cross-sectional area loss.
Item Function Failure mode Failure
mechanism
Failure
symptom
Pump
vane
Pumping
mass ﬂow
Cross sectional
area loss
Corrosion/
erosion
Flow mass loss
Pressure diﬀerence
variation(AGs), redundant tests (RTs) and feedback loops (FLs), etc.
Achieved testability, which is a system design attribute, can
be deﬁned as the ability to observe system behavior under spe-
cial test stimulation. Achieved testability analysis usually in-
cludes fault detectable rate (FDR), fault isolable rate (FIR)
and fault predictable rate (FPR). Most of the mentioned con-
cepts are the same as those in traditional testability theory16,21
except predictable faults and fault predictable rate.
Based on the analysis of fault predictability, possible pre-
dictable (PPF) fault can be deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1. Possible predictable fault is a gradual key fault or
key components’ fault.
Further, predictable fault (PF) can be deﬁned:
Deﬁnition 2. Predictable fault is a possible predictable fault of
which the early state is detectable and the evolution process is
trackable.
Deﬁnition 2 describes fault predictability through fault
early state detectability and fault evolution process trackabili-
ty. Predictable faults can be obtained by fault mechanism anal-
ysis and test detectability analysis. In applications, we usually
suppose that if a test can detect the early state of a fault, it also
means the test can track the fault evolution process.
Based on Deﬁnition 1 and Deﬁnition 2, fault predictable
rate can be deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 3. During the stated time span, the ratio of the
number of predictable faults is determined correctly by tests to
the total number of possible predictable faults in a system.
Fault/fault evolution-test dependency described by the inte-
grated model can be represented by a binary dependency ma-
trix based on which testability analysis can be realized.3.2. Binary dependency matrix generation
Given the system fault set is F= {f1, f2, . . . , fm} and the avail-
able test set is T= {t1, t2, . . . , tn}. A binary dependency matrix
B= [bij]m·n is deﬁned to represent the fault/fault evolution-test
dependencies. The rows of B correspond to faults and the col-
umns correspond to tests. Element bij is a two-tuple, bij = (u,
v). If test tj can detect fault fi and its early state, bij = (1, 1).
If test tj can detect fault fi but cannot detect its early state,
bij = (1, 0); the reasons for this scenario may be that the test
has no ability to detect early state of the fault or the fault is
abrupt. If test tj cannot detect fault fi and its early state,
bij = (0, 0) (bij = 0 for short). Generally, if a test can detectFailure eﬀect Monitoring
parameter
Test
conﬁguration
Immediate
eﬀect
Downstream
eﬀect
End
eﬀect
None Decrease
pump
output
eﬃciency
Mission
loss
Flow speed
signal
Speed sensor
Pressure
signal
Pressure
sensor
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so the case bij = (0, 1) will not exist.
3.3. Testability analysis based on matrix B
Given [ denotes Boolean variable OR operation, ¯ denotes
set XOR operation. bij(k) denotes the kth item of the
two-tuple, bij = (u, v), k= 1, 2. Tﬁ denotes the test set which
can detect fault fi, i.e., Tﬁ = {tj|bij(1) = 1,"tj}, Tﬁ ˝ T. Ftj
denotes the fault set which can be detected by test tj, i.e.,
Ftj = {fi|bij(1) = 1, "fi}, Ftj ˝ F. FPP ˝ F denotes possible pre-
dictable faults. Fault prior probability vector is k= [k1
k2 . . .km], and test failure rate vector is R= [r1 r2 . . . rn]. Test
design result vector is X= [x1 x2 . . .xn], where xj (1 6 j 6 n)
denotes the number of the designed test tj, and the vector
Q= [qj] denotes the upper limit of X, i.e., "xj 6 qj, xj 2 Z+.qij ¼ 1þ e
10ðVij0:5Þ 1 1þ eðSNRj0:5Þ 1 1 TTDij
TTFij
 0:5
SyDij
TTFij
 0:2
if TTDij < TTFij
0 if TTDij P TTFij
8<
: ð7Þ(1) Inherent testability analysis
Undetectable faults FUD = {fi|fi 2 F, Tﬁ = Ø}; detectable
faults, FD ¼ ffijfi 2 F; [
n
tj2T
bijð1Þ ¼ 1g; isolable faults FI = {fi|-
fi 2 FD, Tﬁ ¯ Tfj = 1, "fj 2 F, fj „ fi}; ambiguity groups
FAG = {F
0 ˝ F|Tﬁ = Tfj, "fi, fj 2 F0, i „ j}; the number of
faults in an ambiguity group is called ambiguity group size, de-
noted by |F0|. Generally, suppose the given ambiguity group
size is L, then, FI = {fi|fi 2 FD,
P
Tﬁ ¯ Tfj 6 L, "fj 2 F, fj „ fi},
and the opterator ¯ satiﬁes that Tﬁ ¯ Tfj = 1 if Tﬁ ¯ Tfj = 0;
predicatable faults FP ¼ ffijfi 2 FPP \ FD; [
n
tj2T
bijð2Þ ¼ 1g;
redundant tests TR = {T´ ˝ T|Fti = Ftj, "ti, tj 2 T´, i „ j}. De-
note all the gross feedback loops as FB, and FBk is the kth gross
feedback loop. The gross feedback loop searching method
based on matrix B can be referred to Ref.14
(2) Achieved testability analysis
According to Ref. 21, fault detectable rate and fault isolable
rate are deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 4. During the stated time span, the ratio of the
number of faults is detected correctly by tests to the total
number of system faults.
Deﬁnition 5. During the stated time span, the ratio of the num-
ber of faults is isolated correctly to no more than the stated
replaceable units by tests to the number of the detected faults
during the same time span.
For digital systems, a test tj relating to a fault fi also means
the fault fi can be detected by the test tj with probability 1 when
the fault fi occurs. So, we can calculate the FDR, FIR and
FPR directly according to Deﬁnitions 3–5. However, for com-
plex aerospace systems, a test relating to a fault may not mean
the fault can be detected by the test with probability 1. Faultdetection probability greatly depends on test practical attri-
butes such as test reliability, test signal to noise rate (SNR),
sensitivity, timely detection and symptom duration. Obviously,
it is more rational and applicable to take test attributes into ac-
count when analyzing achieved testability level in aerospace
systems. Generally, test reliability can be featured by test fail-
ure rate rj (1 6 j 6 n), test reliability impacts on detectability
and predictability of fault fi can be formulated respectively by
R1i ¼ 1
Y
tj2T
r
xjbijð1Þ
j
R2i ¼ 1
Y
tj2T
r
xjbijð2Þ
j
8><
>: ð6Þ
Test SNR, sensitivity, timely detection and symptom dura-
tion can be named as sensing probability which can be featured
by parameter qij
17:where Vij denotes detection sensitivity of test tj to fault fi, SNRj
denotes SNR of test tj, TTDij denotes the time span between
the initiation of fault fi (potential failure) and the detection
of the fault by the test tj, TTFij refers to the duration between
the initiation of the fault fi and the time when the failure oc-
curs. SyDij denotes symptom duration time span of test tj to
fault fi. Time to detection, time to failure and symptom dura-
tion time span can be obtained by fault simulation or fault
propagation timing analysis method.22
Sensing probability impacts on detectability and predict-
ability of fault fi can be formulated respectively by
P1i ¼
X
tj2T
qijxjbijð1Þ
,X
tj2T
xjbijð1Þ
P2i ¼
X
tj2T
qijxjbijð2Þ
,X
tj2T
xjbijð2Þ
8>>><
>>>:
ð8Þ
According to Eqs. (6) and (8), the total detectable and pre-
dictable probability of fault fi can be formulated respectively by
FD1i ¼ R1i  P1i
FD2i ¼ R2i  P2i
(
ð9Þ
So FDR, FIR and FPR can be formulated respectively by
FDR ¼
X
fi2FD
kiFD
1
i
,X
fi2F
ki
FIR ¼
X
fi2FI
kiFD
1
i
,X
fi2FD
kiFD
1
i
FPR ¼
X
fi2FP
kiFD
2
i
,X
fi2FPP
ki
8>>>>>><
>>>>>>:
ð10Þ4. Application for heading attitude system
The heading attitude system of certain helicopter mainly con-
sists of aviation horizon, combined compass, magnetic
206 G. Liu et al.compass and course position indicator. Aviation horizon,
which is usually used to measure the pitch angle and inclina-
tion angel of helicopter, is one of the important components
in the system. Besides, aviation horizon is also the key compo-
nent resulting in the reduction of reliability and availability of
helicopter, so it is of great signiﬁcance to develop PHM for
aviation horizon. The schematic diagram of certain aviation
horizon is shown in Fig. 3.Fig. 3 Structure diagram of horizon system.The aviation horizon includes gyro, static converter, circuit
board, corrective mechanism, quick righting mechanism, syn-
chronic generator, indicative mechanism, etc. The function
schematic is shown in Fig. 4.Fig. 4 Function schematic of horizon system.The QDG of the horizon system modeled through testabil-
ity analysis, design and evaluation system (TADESª) devel-
oped by our team is shown in Fig. 5.Fig. 5 SystemThe quantitative failure mode attributes are shown in Ta-
ble 2. Assume all the test failure rates are 0.001, the quantita-
tive test attributes are shown in Table 3.
Static converter is a key component and testability should
make the component predictable. We build component level
model based on PoF in order to obtain fault evolution-test
dependencies.
Connecting piece and MOSFET power transistor are the
main constituents of the static converter. The main failure
mechanism of connecting piece is temperature stress and
mechanical stress. Generally, the impact of temperature stress
on connecting piece fatigue life can be modeled by23
Nf ¼ 1
2
Dcs
2n0f
 !1
c
ð11Þ
The impact of mechanical stress on connecting piece fatigue
life can be modeled by24
d ¼ EðPÞT
K
Z
SmPðSÞdS
EðPÞ ¼ m4=m2
mn ¼
R
fnGðfÞdf
8>><
>>:
ð12Þ
We can see that the connecting piece degradation process
can be detected and tracked by vibration sensors and temper-
ature sensors.
For MOSFET power transistor, the degradation model can
be described as25
DD ¼ Kta
K ¼ C½ðIds=WÞexpð/i=ðqkEmÞÞa

ð13Þ
Obviously, the power transistor degradation process can be
detected and tracked by temperature sensors and electrical
stress sensors.
Based on the system and component level models, the bin-
ary matrix for the aviation horizon system is shown in Table 4.
By fault mechanism analysis, f4 and f5 are the key gradual
faults. According to Deﬁnition 1, FPP = {f4, f5}. Based on Ta-
ble 4, results of inherent testability analysis are FUD = Ø,
FD = {fi,|i= 1, 2, . . ., 9}, FI = {fi,|i= 1, 2, . . ., 9}. If ambigu-level model.
Table 2 Failure mode attributes.
Failure mode Belongs to component F_Type F_Prob F_Crit
Voltage output error (f1) 28 V DC power (C1) 0 6.1 · 106 II
Voltage and frequency output error (f2) 26 V AC power (C2) 0 6.3 · 106 II
Wear or jamming (f3) Quick righting mechanism (C3) 0 1.7 · 106 III
Connecting piece fatigue (f4) Static converter (C4) 1 8.0 · 106 I
MOSFET degradation (f5) Static converter (C4) 1 8.0 · 106 I
Gyro output drift (f6) Gyro (C5) 0 6.6 · 106 II
Low corrective speed or no correction (f7) Corrective mechanism (C6) 0 2.6 · 106 III
Heading output error (f8) Synchronic transmitter (C7) 0 1.3 · 106 III
Display error (f9) Indicative mechanism (C8) 0 1.1 · 106 III
Table 3 Test attributes.
Test T_Time
(s)
T_Cost
($)
T_Stnr
(dB)
T_Rate
Voltage (t1) 50 6.0 10 0.001
Voltage (t2) 50 6.0 8 0.001
Voltage and frequency (t3) 60 6.5 2 0.001
Current (t4) 50 15.2 5 0.001
Voltage and frequency (t5) 60 9.4 4 0.001
Voltage and frequency (t6) 60 7.2 7 0.001
Voltage and frequency (t7) 45 6.0 6 0.001
Voltage (t8) 40 7.0 8 0.001
Vibration (t9) 45 6.6 10 0.001
Temperature (t10) 55 8.2 12 0.001
Electrical stress (t11) 40 8.6 15 0.001
Table 6 Related calculation results.
Failure mode Parameter
R1i P
1
i FD
1
i R
2
i P
2
i FD
2
i
f1 1.000 0.5812 0.5812 0 0 0
f2 1.000 0.5971 0.5971 0 0 0
f3 1.000 0.5958 0.5958 0 0 0
f4 1.000 0.6422 0.6422 1.000 0.6934 0.6934
f5 1.000 0.6468 0.6468 1.000 0.7097 0.7097
f6 1.000 0.6675 0.6675 0 0 0
f7 1.000 0.6290 0.6290 0 0 0
f8 0.999 0.6029 0.6023 0 0 0
f9 0.999 0.7602 0.7594 0 0 0
A novel testability model for health management of heading attitude system 207ity group size equals 1, then FAG = Ø. FP = {f4, f5}, TR = Ø.
There are no feedback loops in the system.
We can see that the system’s inherent testability is very
good. In engineering applications, if inherent testability analy-
sis cannot satisfy the system’s requirements, system designTable 4 Fault/fault evolution-test matrix.
Failure mode Time
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5
f1 (1,0) 0 (1,0) (1,0) (1,0)
f2 0 (1,0) 0 0 (1,0)
f3 0 0 0 (1,0) (1,0)
f4 0 0 (1,0) (1,0) (1,0)
f5 0 0 (1,0) (1,0) (1,0)
f6 0 0 0 (1,0) (1,0)
f7 0 0 0 (1,0) (1,0)
f8 0 0 0 0 (1,0)
f9 0 0 0 0 0
Table 5 qij results.
Failure mode Time
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5
f1 0.6943 0 0.5078 0.5320 0.4766
f2 0 0.6940 0 0 0.4766
f3 0 0 0 0.5320 0.4766
f4 0 0 0.6219 0.6143 0.5221
f5 0 0 0.6219 0.6143 0.5221
f6 0 0 0 0.6868 0.5639
f7 0 0 0 0.5746 0.5221
f8 0 0 0 0 0.6029
f9 0 0 0 0 0scheme should be changed such as adding tests, adjusting com-
ponent layout or reducing feedback loops, etc. When the
scheme is amended, testability model and dependency matrix
should be regenerated for further inherent testability analysis
until system’s requirements are satisﬁed.t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11
0 (1,0) (1,0) 0 0 0
0 0 (1,0) 0 0 0
(1,0) (1,0) (1,0) 0 0 0
0 (1,0) (1,0) (1,1) (1,1) 0
0 (1,0) (1,0) 0 (1,1) (1,1)
0 (1,0) (1,0) 0 0 0
0 (1,0) (1,0) 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 (1,0) 0 0 0
t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11
0 0.6561 0.6207 0 0 0
0 0 0.6207 0 0 0
0.6201 0.6561 0.6940 0 0 0
0 0.6916 0.6584 0.7282 0.6587 0
0 0.6916 0.6584 0 0.6587 0.7607
0 0.6916 0.7279 0 0 0
0 0.7253 0.6940 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0.7602 0 0 0
208 G. Liu et al.Assume the test symptom duration is equivalent to the
time-to-failure, which is 100 time units. The fault detection
sensitivity of all the tests to all the faults is 0.9, and the number
of each type test is 1. Accroding to Eq. (7), the qij results are
shown in Table 5.
According to Eqs. 6, 8, and 9, the related calculation results
are shown in Table 6.
According to Eq. (10), the achieved testability analysis re-
sults are FDR= 0.6992, FIR = 1.0000 and FPR= 0.7016.
One can see that the fault detectable level and fault predictable
level are not good, so test reliability and conﬁdence degree
should be enhanced in practical applications.
5. Conclusions
To address the problems that the traditional testability models
do not include any quantitative PHM-related testability infor-
mation and cannot describe fault evolution-test dependency,
an integrated testability model for aerospace system PHM is
proposed.
(1) Based on QDG and FFA, a system level modeling
approach is introduced, which can describe fault-test
dependency and quantitative testability information
effectively.
(2) By incorporating PoF into components and combining
the extended FMMEA, component level model can be
constructed, which can be used to analyze fault evolu-
tion-test dependency.
(3) Testability analysis for PHM is presented in great detail.
Compared to the traditional analysis, the analysis pro-
cess adds some fault prognostics-related information
such as possible predictable faults, predictable faults
and fault predictable rate. Further, test actual attributes
are considered in the analysis process.
(4) A case is given in detail to demonstrate the proposed
hierarchical modeling methodology for a heading atti-
tude system. The application results show the proposed
approach is feasible and effective, and this approach can
be used for testability analysis and design for PHM of
any system.Acknowledgement
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